The shocking collection of stories is from events that happened in the immediate range of vision of an economic leader which present how the group of managers can obtain the ownership rights of the producing units they manage (be they cooperatives or state companies) by making use of the possibilities provided by the Transformation Act and the economic regulators and under what conditions does the privatization of state owned enterprises take place and how.

It is the continuation of the text published in the previous issue in which the participants primarily discuss the system of conditions for self-government in production, and its connections with the questions of ownership interests.

In this conversation with some of the participants of the talks, one can read about the endeavours represented by the negotiating sides and the tactics of negotiation serving those goals.

Reform concepts that receive support today do not wish to make the collectives of employers the owners. The author proves that self-government and economic rationality do not exclude one another.

Discussing the causes behind the lasting lack of performance of the Hungarian economy, the author discusses three main causes: the political private property and its nature, its dominant role in the Hungarian economy, and the lack of coordination of articulate, varied forms of ownership. He argues that what is needed is the reform of the structure and not of the forms of ownership.